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OPINION OF THE COURT 
______ 
 
 
FISHER, Circuit Judge. 
In 2013, Anthony Hildebrand sued his former employer 
for age discrimination in the United States District Court for 
the Western District of Pennsylvania. When jurisdiction was 
returned to the District Court in 2015 after an appeal to this 
Court and the United States Supreme Court, Hildebrand’s sole 
remaining claim stagnated for three years. The docket idled 
until 2018, shortly after the death of Hildebrand’s former 
supervisor, a key witness. At that point, the employer filed a 
motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute pursuant to Federal 
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Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). The District Court granted the 
motion and dismissed the suit. We will vacate the dismissal and 
remand for further proceedings. 
I.  
 In his complaint, Hildebrand alleges that the Allegheny 
County District Attorney’s Office (the “DA’s Office”) had an 
established practice of targeting older detectives to force them 
out of their jobs. He avers that Chief Detective Dennis Logan, 
Assistant Chief Richard Ealing, and Director of Administration 
Dawn Botsford engaged in purposeful, discriminatory 
behavior in the form of disparate treatment, retaliation, and 
“trumped-up” reasons to fire older detectives. Hildebrand’s 
amended complaint details paragraph after paragraph of 
alleged insults. For the purposes of this appeal, we need only 
summarize these copious allegations. 
Hildebrand was hired by the DA’s Office in 2005, after 
fifteen years as an undercover narcotics detective with the City 
of Pittsburgh Police Department. He performed his job 
responsibilities satisfactorily and without incident for roughly 
four years. In 2009, Ealing was assigned as his new supervisor. 
From that time until his termination in February 2011, 
Hildebrand alleges he was subject to several forms of age-
based discrimination.  
First, Hildebrand alleges that his supervisors and peers 
derided him with age-related insults. Among many other 
taunts, they called him “an ‘old man’ who would never learn 
how to use a computer because of his age,” App. 26, and stated 
that he had “Alzheimer’s and was too old to comprehend” his 
orders, App. 27. Ealing either was the source of these insults 
or failed to stop them, including when Hildebrand submitted 
complaints. 
Second, Hildebrand alleges that his workload changed 
for the worse due to his age. He alleges that Ealing divided his 
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responsibilities among younger investigators and assigned 
Hildebrand meaningless busywork that his younger peers did 
not have to perform. He further claims that he was deprived of 
overtime hours, counter to a tradition of assigning those hours 
to detectives with seniority, like Hildebrand. 
Third, Hildebrand claims that his supervisors subjected 
his work to heightened scrutiny, questioning him extensively 
about his cases in a way that the younger detectives were not 
questioned, and trumping up false disciplinary charges that 
were meant to create a paper trail to support his termination.  
Eventually, Hildebrand was demoted from a narcotics-
division detective to general investigations and was relocated 
to a space with no desk, no working computer, and no phone. 
When Hildebrand asked why, Ealing became combative and 
countered that neither he nor Chief Detective Logan had to 
answer any of the “old son of a bitches [sic]” questions. App. 
34-35. Hildebrand alleges that Ealing told him that he had 
gotten rid of old detectives previously and he was doing the 
same to Hildebrand. Hildebrand further asserts that Ealing and 
Logan obstructed him from filing a grievance regarding his 
demotion.  
In February 2011, Hildebrand was suspended for five 
days without pay when Ealing and Logan accused him of 
committing several violations, including using a DA’s Office 
vehicle for personal use without permission—something that 
younger detectives regularly did without repercussions. 
Hildebrand alleges that several of the other supposed violations 
“never occurred.” App. 43.  
Hildebrand appealed his suspension to the Director of 
Administration, Dawn Botsford, who met with him for twenty 
minutes and did not allow him to present any evidence. A union 
meeting was held to vote on whether to grieve Hildebrand’s 
suspension. Logan appeared at the meeting—allegedly only 
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the second time in his career that he attended such a meeting—
for the alleged purpose of “intimidat[ing] any union members 
who supported Hildebrand.” App. 44. The union voted not to 
appeal Hildebrand’s suspension. Hildebrand was terminated in 
February 2011.  
Hildebrand alleges the negative treatment continued 
after termination. He applied for payment for his unused sick 
days, “which was the practice of the [DA’s Office],” but was 
denied. App. 44. Hildebrand also alleges that Ealing tried to 
obstruct his application for a private investigator license. 
Hildebrand filed a complaint with the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission. The EEOC sent him a 
Determination and Right to Sue Notice. He then filed a 
complaint in the District Court against Allegheny County and 
the DA’s Office, alleging violations of the ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 
621, et seq., constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 
and several state law claims. The Defendants moved to dismiss 
Hildebrand’s ADEA claim for timeliness and his constitutional 
and state law claims for inadequate pleading. The District 
Court granted the motion, Hildebrand appealed, and this Court 
affirmed the dismissal of the § 1983 claims and reversed as to 
the ADEA claim. Hildebrand v. Allegheny Cty., 757 F.3d 99 
(3d Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1398 (2015).1 
Hildebrand filed a petition for certiorari regarding the 
dismissed claims, which the Supreme Court denied. 
While his petition was pending, the DA’s Office filed a 
motion to dismiss the ADEA claim pursuant to Federal Rules 
                                              
1 Since Allegheny County was only alleged to have 
violated § 1983, it was dismissed from the action. 
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of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), 12(b)(6),2 and 12(b)(7). 
Hildebrand filed a motion to stay the motion to dismiss “until 
appellate proceedings [were] concluded,” which was granted. 
App. 118. Concurrently, Hildebrand also filed a substantive 
response to the pending motion to dismiss “so that it could be 
adjudicated upon” resolution of the petition for certiorari. 
Appellant’s Br. 3.  
After the Supreme Court denied Hildebrand’s petition 
for certiorari and jurisdiction was returned to the District Court 
in February 2015, the docket remained administratively closed 
due to clerical error. No action was taken by the court or either 
party for the next three years. The court did not lift the stay, 
adjudicate the fully-briefed motion to dismiss, or schedule a 
status conference. Hildebrand did not follow up by filing a 
motion or making any other contact with the District Court. 
The DA’s Office also did not follow up on its pending motion 
to dismiss. Only after the death of one of its key witnesses, 
Ealing, did the DA’s Office file a motion to dismiss for failure 
to prosecute, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
41(b). The District Court granted the motion, and Hildebrand 
now appeals, arguing that the District Court abused its 
discretion.  
II.  
 The District Court had federal question jurisdiction over 
Hildebrand’s ADEA and § 1983 claims and supplemental 
                                              
2 The DA’s Office moved to dismiss the remaining 
state law claims—not the ADEA claim—pursuant to Rule 
12(b)(6). The DA’s Office stated it was unclear at the time it 
filed the motion whether “the Third Circuit’s order has 
resurrected the Pennsylvania law claims,” but if it did, the 
DA’s Office renewed its previous Rule 12(b)(6) motion to 
dismiss those claims. App. 98. 
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jurisdiction over his related state law claims. 28 U.S.C. §§ 
1331, 1367. This Court has appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. § 1291. “We review a District Court’s decision to 
dismiss a plaintiff’s case pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 41(b) for an abuse of discretion.” Briscoe v. Klaus, 
538 F.3d 252, 257 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing Emerson v. Thiel 
Coll., 296 F.3d 184, 190 (3d Cir. 2002)). 
III.  
A defendant may move to dismiss a claim against him 
where “the plaintiff fails to prosecute or to comply with [the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure] or a court order.” Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 41(b). A district court should consider six factors when 
determining whether to dismiss a case under Rule 41(b). Poulis 
v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 747 F.2d 863, 868 (3d Cir. 
1984). The court abuses its discretion where it fails to properly 
consider and balance those factors, namely:  
(1) the extent of the party’s personal 
responsibility; (2) the prejudice to the adversary 
caused by the failure to meet scheduling orders 
and respond to discovery; (3) a history of 
dilatoriness; (4) whether the conduct of the party 
or the attorney was willful or in bad faith; (5) the 
effectiveness of sanctions other than dismissal, 
which entails an analysis of alternative 
sanctions; and (6) the meritoriousness of the 
claim or defense. 
 
Id. (emphasis omitted). The record must support the District 
Court’s findings on the six factors. Id. The court found that five 
of the factors weighed in favor of dismissal and one factor, 
willful or bad faith conduct, was neutral. 
This Court has acknowledged that “we do not have a 
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‘magic formula’ or ‘mechanical calculation’ to determine 
whether a District Court abused its discretion in dismissing a 
plaintiff’s case.” Briscoe, 538 F.3d at 263 (quoting Mindek v. 
Rigatti, 964 F.2d 1369, 1373 (3d Cir. 1992)). None of the 
Poulis factors is alone dispositive, and it is also true that not all 
of the factors need to be satisfied to justify dismissal of a 
complaint for lack of prosecution. Id. Dismissal is a sanction 
rightfully in the district courts’ toolbox, and this Court “has not 
hesitated to affirm the district court’s imposition of sanctions, 
including dismissals in appropriate cases.” Poulis, 747 F.2d at 
867 n.1. However, dismissal must be appropriate. 
The Supreme Court describes dismissal with prejudice 
as an “extreme” sanction. Nat’l Hockey League v. Metro. 
Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639, 643 (1976). We too have 
repeatedly acknowledged that “dismissals with prejudice or 
defaults are drastic sanctions” that “must be a sanction of last, 
not first, resort.” Poulis, 747 F.2d at 867, 869; see also Briscoe, 
538 F.3d at 258; Emerson, 296 F.3d at 190. If the case is close, 
“doubts should be resolved in favor of reaching a decision on 
the merits.” Adams v. Trs. of the N.J. Brewery Emps.’ Pension 
Tr. Fund, 29 F.3d 863, 870 (3d Cir. 1994) (quoting 
Scarborough v. Eubanks, 747 F.2d 871, 878 (3d Cir. 1984)). 
Without a doubt, cases should be decided on the merits barring 
substantial circumstances in support of the contrary outcome. 
 The District Court failed to mention this strong policy 
favoring decisions on the merits at any point in its 
memorandum opinion. While that alone is not an abuse of 
discretion, we are not convinced that the court had this policy 
in mind when it analyzed the Poulis factors and dismissed 
Hildebrand’s case with prejudice.  
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A. Application of the Poulis factors 
1. The extent of the party’s responsibility 
The District Court found Hildebrand personally 
responsible for the three-year hiatus, stating that, as the person 
with the “most at stake,” App. 10, it is implausible that 
Hildebrand would not have asked his counsel about the status 
of his case. However, there is no record evidence of 
Hildebrand’s involvement or lack thereof, so this conclusion 
was conjectural and not based on the record. There is no 
evidence that Hildebrand was personally responsible for the 
delay, and the District Court erred in holding him so. The 
District Court relied on the principle that it is not unjust to the 
client to dismiss his case because of his counsel’s “unexcused 
conduct.” Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 633 (1962). 
However, this Court has “increasingly emphasized visiting 
sanctions directly on the delinquent lawyer, rather than on a 
client who is not actually at fault.” Carter v. Albert Einstein 
Med. Ctr., 804 F.2d 805, 807 (3d Cir. 1986) (considering 
dismissal as discovery sanction under Fed. R. Civ. P. 37); see 
also Burns v. MacMeekin (In re MacMeekin), 722 F.2d 32, 35 
(3d Cir. 1983) (requiring district courts to consider and rule out 
alternative remedies because “[t]he brunt of the order [to 
dismiss] falls on plaintiffs, who have been deprived of the 
opportunity to litigate their case on the merits, when the only 
culpable party may well be their attorney”). Poulis is one 
example of this emphasis. There, we distinguished between a 
party’s responsibility for delay and counsel’s responsibility. 
747 F.2d at 868. Because the attorney “acknowledged the 
delays were his responsibility,” caused by personal illness and 
family matters, we concluded that the personal responsibility 
factor did not weigh in favor of dismissal. Id.; see also Carter, 
804 F.2d at 806-07 (finding plaintiff not personally responsible 
even when he knew of his attorney’s dereliction). “[I]n 
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determining whether dismissal is appropriate, we look to 
whether the party bears personal responsibility for the action 
or inaction which led to the dismissal.” Adams, 29 F.3d at 873. 
We have focused on the plaintiff’s personal responsibility in 
multiple Rule 41 cases. See Dunbar v. Triangle Lumber and 
Supply Co., 816 F.2d 126, 128-29 (3d Cir. 1987) (vacating and 
remanding after Rule 41 dismissal because, although 
attorney’s conduct rose to “the level of willfulness and 
contumaciousness necessary to support the sanction of 
dismissal,” there was no evidence that the plaintiff was aware 
of “her counsel’s defaults or otherwise bore some personal 
responsibility for his professional irresponsibility”); Briscoe, 
538 F.3d at 258-59 (vacating and remanding after Rule 41 
dismissal because, even though plaintiff represented himself, 
there was insufficient evidence that his failure to comply was 
his own doing, as opposed to the result of an external factor he 
could not control).  
Conversely, this Court has held corporate plaintiffs 
personally responsible for the dilatory actions of their in-house 
counsel. Adams, 29 F.3d at 873. In Adams, the corporate 
plaintiff was personally responsible because its in-house 
counsel’s actions did not reflect “the sympathetic situation of 
an innocent client suffering the sanction of dismissal due to 
dilatory counsel whom it hired to represent it.” Id. at 873 
(internal citation omitted). As counsel and client were 
essentially the same entity, the plaintiff was not permitted to 
hide behind ignorance of its counsel’s dilatoriness. 
Because Hildebrand is a natural person represented by 
private counsel, not a corporation represented by its own 
employees, the facts of this case are more like Dunbar and 
Briscoe than Adams as they relate to the personal responsibility 
Poulis factor. The District Court conjectured that, because 
Hildebrand was unemployed, it was “implausible that [he] 
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would not have at least inquired of his counsel over the last 
three years . . . as to why his ADEA claim was not moving 
forward.” App. 10. Hildebrand’s unemployment and his likely 
desire to have his case resolved do not automatically indicate 
that he and his counsel discussed why his case had not 
proceeded. It is entirely possible that Hildebrand, a non-
lawyer, was patiently awaiting the resolution of what he 
assumed were lengthy appeals. The court did not base its 
conclusion that Hildebrand knew about his counsel’s delay on 
record evidence, and instead, it resolved doubts about 
Hildebrand’s personal involvement against a decision on the 
merits. Without record evidence supporting the notion that 
Hildebrand was personally responsible for the delay, the 
District Court should not have weighed this factor in favor of 
dismissal. 
2. Prejudice to the adversary 
The District Court appropriately concluded that 
Ealing’s death, which occurred near the end of the three-year 
hiatus, prejudiced the DA’s Office. The resulting loss of 
evidence is important when considering the appropriateness of 
dismissal, but is not dispositive.  
Prejudice to the adversary is a particularly important 
factor in the Poulis analysis, and evidence of “true 
prejudice . . . bear[s] substantial weight in support of a 
dismissal.” Scarborough, 747 F.2d at 876. Relevant examples 
of prejudice include “the irretrievable loss of evidence[] [and] 
the inevitable dimming of witnesses’ memories.” Id. The bar is 
not so high that a party needs to show “irremediable harm” for 
the prejudice to weigh in favor of dismissal. Ware v. Rodale 
Press, Inc., 322 F.3d 218, 222 (3d Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). 
An inability to prepare “a full and complete trial strategy is 
sufficiently prejudicial.” Id.  
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The DA’s Office argues that allegations against Ealing 
were at the heart of Hildebrand’s claims and, therefore, 
Ealing’s assistance and availability were essential to its 
preparation of an adequate trial strategy. Hildebrand’s own 
allegations make it clear that Ealing was a key witness. 
Hildebrand argues that the contention that Ealing was at the 
center of his claims against the DA’s Office is not supported 
by the pleadings. He points to several sources of evidence that 
he believes would enable the DA’s Office to “fully defend” 
itself without Ealing’s testimony: the testimony of Botsford 
and Logan, who were involved in Hildebrand’s termination 
and allegedly worked with Ealing to force out older employees; 
witnesses who heard Ealing’s alleged public insults; and 
written documentation from and testimony of witnesses to 
official meetings where Hildebrand attempted to file 
grievances. 
 However, even assuming all of that evidence exists and 
is available, several of Hildebrand’s allegations involve 
interactions with Ealing alone. These include several instances 
where Ealing allegedly made age-based insults, reassigned 
Hildebrand’s work responsibilities, and informed Hildebrand 
he was on a path toward termination due to his age. Ealing’s 
death amounts to an irremediable loss of evidence. While other 
evidence may be available to the DA’s Office, that evidence 
cannot replace Ealing for the purposes of preparing a full and 
complete trial strategy. The witnesses whom the parties rely on 
to fill the gaps will inevitably have dimmed memories from the 
delay. And, as the District Court points out, Ealing’s death 
undermines the jury’s opportunity to weigh the credibility of 
Hildebrand’s accusations versus Ealing’s demeanor and 
responses in open court. This prejudice to the DA’s Office 
bears substantial weight in favor of dismissal, but it is not 
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dispositive of the appropriateness of imposing the harshest 
sanction available.3 
3. History of dilatoriness 
The District Court did not act outside its discretion in 
determining that the timeline—a three-year hiatus in five and 
a half years of litigation—weighs in favor of dismissal. 
However, the weight the District Court gave to this factor 
should have been mitigated by Hildebrand’s otherwise 
responsible litigation history. 
“[E]xtensive or repeated delay or delinquency 
constitutes a history of dilatoriness . . . .” Adams, 29 F.3d at 
874. Normally, “conduct that occurs one or two times is 
insufficient to demonstrate a ‘history of dilatoriness,’” Briscoe, 
538 F.3d at 261 (quoting Scarborough, 747 F.2d at 875). Most 
cases where the court found a history of dilatoriness involved 
repeated delay. See, e.g., Ware, 322 F.3d at 224 (finding a 
history of dilatory conduct where plaintiffs “failed repeatedly” 
to provide a damages calculation over a five-year period); 
Emerson, 296 F.3d at 191 (finding a history of dilatory conduct 
where plaintiff made multiple requests for stays and failed to 
meet deadlines). 
In addition to repeated acts, we have also held that 
“extensive” delay can create a history of dilatoriness. Adams, 
29 F.3d at 874. “‘[F]ailure to prosecute’ under the Rule 41(b) 
does not mean that the plaintiff must have taken any positive 
steps to delay the trial . . . . It is quite sufficient if he does 
                                              
3 It is noteworthy that the District Court observed that 
Hildebrand also suffered prejudice as a result of the lengthy 
delay: “[t]he loss of Eagling [sic] is detrimental to both the 
Plaintiff and his ability to prove the specific acts of 
discrimination which he alleges, as well as the Defendant’s 
defense of this case.” App. 12.  
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nothing . . . .” Id. at 875 (citation omitted). While extensive 
delay may weigh in favor of dismissal, “a party’s problematic 
acts must be evaluated in light of its behavior over the life of 
the case.” Id. For instance, because the plaintiff in Adams had 
litigated the case responsibly for ten years prior to the hiatus, 
the delay was “somewhat mitigated” and “weigh[ed] toward, 
but [did] not mandate, dismissal.” Id. 
Hildebrand’s case is like Adams; while Hildebrand had 
not litigated his case responsibly for as long as ten years, he 
had done so for nearly two and a half years prior to the delay. 
The District Court appropriately concluded that the extensive 
delay weighed in favor of dismissal. However, Hildebrand’s 
conduct has not been delinquent at any other point, and the fact 
that his delay was an isolated incident—albeit, a three-year-
long one—should serve to mitigate the weight the District 
Court placed in favor of dismissal. 
4. Willful or bad-faith conduct 
The District Court found that Hildebrand did not cause 
the delay willfully or in bad faith. Neither party contests this 
point. The court concluded that this factor was neutral in the 
Poulis analysis. Because the delay was not effectuated by a 
self-serving or bad-faith tactic, the court should have weighed 
this factor against dismissal.  
In evaluating this factor, a court should look for “the 
type of willful or contumacious behavior” that can be 
characterized as “‘flagrant bad faith,’” such as failing to 
answer interrogatories for nearly a year and a half, demanding 
numerous extensions, ignoring admonitions by the court, and 
making false promises to correct delays. Scarborough, 747 
F.2d at 875 (citing Nat’l Hockey League, 427 U.S. at 643). 
“Willfulness involves intentional or self-serving behavior.” 
Adams, 29 F.3d at 875. A lengthy delay reflects “inexcusable 
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negligent behavior,” id. at 876, but that behavior alone does not 
rise to the level of willfulness or bad faith. 
In this case, there is no evidence on the record that the 
three-year hiatus was part of any bad-faith tactic by 
Hildebrand. Hildebrand’s counsel blamed the fact that the 
docket remained closed after the appellate proceedings 
concluded and stated that she thought the DA’s Office’s 
motion to dismiss from before the appeal was still in line to be 
adjudicated. The delay was caused by administrative confusion 
as much as anything else. While these excuses do not fully 
explain why counsel did not follow up with the District Court, 
they at least offer some insight into how the delay happened, 
unlike Adams, where the plaintiff offered no explanation for 
the delay. Id. at 876. Because the harsh sanction of dismissal 
should serve to deter bad faith or self-serving behavior, and 
because of our policy of favoring decisions on the merits, the 
fact that the delay was not effectuated willfully or in bad faith 
should weigh against dismissal.  
5. Effectiveness of sanctions other than 
dismissal 
The District Court offered only one paragraph on 
alternative sanctions in which it considered fines as the only 
alternative, but dismissed them as ineffective to cure Ealing’s 
absence at trial. 
A district court must consider alternative sanctions 
before dismissing a case with prejudice. Briscoe, 538 F.3d at 
262. “Alternatives are particularly appropriate when the 
plaintiff has not personally contributed to the delinquency,” as 
is the case here. Poulis, 747 F.2d at 866 (citation omitted). It 
bears repeating that important in the overall Poulis analysis, 
and particularly in the consideration of alternative sanctions, is 
that “district courts should be reluctant to deprive a plaintiff of 
the right to have his claim adjudicated on the merits.” Adams, 
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29 F.3d at 876 (quoting Titus v. Mercedes Benz, 695 F.2d 746, 
749 (3d Cir. 1982)). We have repeatedly stated that 
“[d]ismissal must be a sanction of last, not first, resort.” Id. at 
878 (quoting Poulis, 747 F.2d at 869); see also Emasco Ins. 
Co. v. Sambrick, 834 F.2d 71, 75 (3d Cir. 1987); Carter, 804 
F.2d at 807.4  
While district courts need not put on the record 
consideration of every possible sanction before dismissing a 
case with prejudice, the District Court’s analysis is insufficient 
                                              
4 Several of our sister circuits echo the importance of 
thorough consideration of alternative sanctions before 
dismissal. See, e.g., Peterson v. Archstone Cmtys. LLC, 637 
F.3d 416, 418 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (emphasizing the importance 
of trying “less dire alternatives” before imposing the harsh 
sanction of dismissal); 3 Penny Theater Corp. v. Plitt 
Theatres, Inc., 812 F.2d 337, 339 (7th Cir. 1987) (“A Rule 
41(b) dismissal is appropriate when . . . other sanctions have 
proved unavailing.” (citation omitted)); Hamilton v. Neptune 
Orient Lines, Ltd., 811 F.2d 498, 500 (9th Cir. 1987) (“While 
there is no requirement that every conceivable sanction be 
examined, meaningful alternatives must be explored . . . . 
Where there is no indication that such alternative actions were 
weighed and found wanting, a dismissal pursuant to Rule 
41(b) is more difficult to sustain.” (citations omitted)); 
Canada v. Mathews, 449 F.2d 253, 255 (5th Cir. 1971) (per 
curiam) (“[W]e have consistently held that a dismissal with 
prejudice is warranted only in extreme circumstances and 
only after the Trial Court, in the exercise of its unquestionable 
authority to control its own docket, has resorted to the wide 
range of lesser sanctions which it may impose upon the 
litigant or the derelict attorney, or both.” (internal quotation 
marks and footnotes omitted)). 
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to honor our longstanding tradition of favoring decisions on the 
merits. The court focuses its brief analysis on fully resolving 
the problems caused by the hiatus and Ealing’s death, see App. 
13, even though we have never held that alternative sanctions 
need be completely ameliorative. In most cases, including here, 
placing the aggrieved party in the position it was in prior to the 
dilatory behavior would be impossible. Rather, alternative 
sanctions need only be effective toward mitigating the 
prejudice caused by dilatory behavior or delinquency. In this 
case, evidentiary or other sanctions may have been sufficient. 
While it is generally in the District Court’s discretion to 
consider whether those or other sanctions would be effective, 
it failed to offer any such analysis. The court should have more 
fully considered whether sanctions other than fines may have 
been effective. 
6. Meritoriousness of Hildebrand’s ADEA 
claim 
The District Court altogether failed to address the 
meritoriousness of Hildebrand’s ADEA claim. In a single 
paragraph, the court examined the meritoriousness of the 
wrong “claim[] or defense,” Poulis, 747 F.2d at 869-70, 
focusing solely on Hildebrand’s defense of the DA’s Office’s 
Rule 41(b) motion to dismiss. See App. 13-14 (“Because 
[Hildebrand] failed to offer the [c]ourt a plausible explanation 
as to why he and his attorney did nothing for three years, the 
[c]ourt has been given no defense to weigh on [Hildebrand’s] 
behalf. Thus, this factor weighs in favor of dismissal.”). This 
analysis misses the mark. 
The standard for determining whether a plaintiff’s 
claims are meritorious “is moderate.” Adams, 29 F.3d at 876. 
“[W]e do not purport to use summary judgment standards. A 
claim, or defense, will be deemed meritorious when the 
allegations of the pleadings, if established at trial, would 
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support recovery by plaintiff or would constitute a complete 
defense.” Poulis, 747 F.2d at 869-70; see also Briscoe, 538 
F.3d at 263 (“[W]e use the standard for a Rule 12(b)(6) motion 
to dismiss for failure to state a claim.” (citing Poulis, 747 F.3d 
at 869-70)).  
Under Poulis, the District Court was required to 
examine whether Hildebrand’s ADEA claim had merit. See 
Briscoe, 538 F.3d at 263; Adams, 29 F.3d at 876-77. Yet, the 
court did not make any reference to the ADEA claim 
whatsoever, much less analyze its merits. If the District Court 
had evaluated the amended complaint for meritoriousness and 
applied the correct standard, it would have found that 
Hildebrand’s claim was meritorious. 
Hildebrand alleges sufficient facts to plausibly state an 
ADEA claim, which is evident from even a glance at the 
amended complaint. He adequately alleges a hostile work 
environment, including page upon page of disparate treatment 
and adverse employment decisions based on his age. He claims 
he was retaliated against for complaining about the negative 
treatment, and he alleges his age was the motivation for his 
termination. Its meritoriousness is further evidenced by the fact 
that the DA’s Office filed three motions to dismiss in this case, 
none of which argued that the ADEA claim was not pled with 
the specificity needed to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to 
dismiss. See District Ct. Dkt. Nos. 8-9, 17-19, 33-34.  
B. Balancing of the Poulis Factors 
Because there is no “magic formula” or “mechanical 
calculation” in evaluating a Rule 41(b) motion to dismiss, we 
generally afford great deference to district courts’ discretion. 
However, we have never upheld a court’s dismissal when it 
was supported by an inadequate foundation on even one of the 
Poulis factors. See, e.g., Adams, 29 F.3d at 874, 876, 878 
(vacating dismissal after a misapplication of three factors); 
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Carter, 804 F.2d at 808 (vacating dismissal in part after a 
misapplication of one factor); Scarborough, 747 F.2d at 876-
77 (vacating dismissal after a misapplication of two factors); 
Titus, 695 F.2d 747 (vacating dismissal after a misapplication 
of one factor). Where it is apparent that a district court 
misstated the law, relied upon findings that were not supported 
by the record, or did not consider the motion in light of our 
strong policy in favor of deciding cases on the merits, we must 
conclude that it abused its discretion. Here, the District Court 
committed all three errors. 
The District Court dismissed Hildebrand’s case 
pursuant to Rule 41(b) after concluding that five factors 
weighed in favor of dismissal. However, its conclusions 
regarding three of those five factors rested on inadequate 
foundations. The court held that Hildebrand was personally 
responsible for the delay when no record evidence exists to 
support that notion. Rather than resolving doubts “in favor of 
reaching a decision on the merits,” Emerson, 296 F.3d at 190, 
the District Court made unsupported assumptions about 
Hildebrand’s personal involvement and responsibility and 
resolved doubts in favor of dismissal. The court offered 
perfunctory consideration of whether alternative sanctions 
would be effective and appropriate here, flying in the face of 
our policy of choosing dismissal as a last resort. And, finally, 
the District Court offered no consideration of whether 
Hildebrand’s ADEA claim was meritorious, instead applying 
an inapposite standard to that factor. Additionally, the court 
found that the willfulness or bad faith factor was neutral in the 
absence of any bad faith or self-serving action. It should have 
concluded that where no bad faith or willfulness exists, that 
factor weighs against dismissal. 
The court was correct in its analysis that the DA’s 
Office was prejudiced by the delay because of Ealing’s death 
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and that Hildebrand’s long delay supports a finding of a history 
of dilatoriness in light of Adams. However, we will not 
postulate whether the District Court would have still ordered 
dismissal, or whether that dismissal would have been 
appropriate, where only two factors weighed in favor of 
dismissal, including prejudice, which bears “substantial weight 
in support of a dismissal.” Scarborough, 747 F.2d at 876. 
Rather, “[t]he scope of our review is restricted to determining 
whether the district court abused its discretion. How we 
imagine we might have exercised our own discretion had we 
been in the district court judge’s robe is entirely irrelevant.” 
Mindek, 964 F.2d at 1373-74. 
Where, as here, a district court fails to apply the correct 
standard, including a failure to consider the Poulis factors in 
light of our clear and repeated instruction to resolve doubt in 
favor of a decision on the merits, we must conclude that the 
court abused its discretion.  
IV.   
For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the District 
Court’s order of dismissal and remand for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion.     
